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PREMISE AND THE ADAMSON ACT
INTRODUCTION
Many acts of the legislature require persons to expend money
or to be curtailed in their liberty of contract, and impose a fine
or imprisonment, or both, if the act be not obeyed. They plainly
deprive persons of their liberty and property without any other
process than the legislative command itself. At the same time
the deprivation does not go to the extent of being confiscatory.
It does not so far prevent a fair profit in a legitimate business
or occupation as to drive people out of it. The much talked of
Adamson Law is an act of this sort. It takes the property of
the railroads by requiring for a few months the same wage
for eight hours work that was paid for ten hours, and by impos-
ing a fine if this provision is not obeyed. It deprives the rail-
roads of their liberty because it interferes with their liberty to
contract with their employees as to wages. The only process
is the legislative command itself. No point, however, was made
in the case recently decided by the United States Supreme Court
that the deprivation of liberty and property was confiscatory.
To avoid an act of the legislature, it is not enough that liberty
and property are taken. The taking must be "without due
process of law," i. e., without justification. If the act provides
no process other than its mandate, the question arises: When
is the legislative command, and that alone, "due process of law"
and when is it not?
39
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The first appeal is usually to the "police power." Liberty
and property, it is said, are held on such reasonable conditions
as may be imposed by the governing power of the state in the
exercise of its police powers, and, therefore, an act which falls
within the police power is justified, although it deprives some
person of liberty or property.1 This of course gets us nowhere.
To say that acts are "due process" when they are within the
police power and not "due process" when they are not within
the police power is just a way of saying that they are "due
process" when they are, and not when they are not. By the
time you have defined "police power" (which, by the way, the
courts never define) you might as well have defined "due
process."
Some of the efforts of distinguished judges to improve upon
the "police power" as a test for "due process" have quite
plainly failed. In C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire,2 Mr.
Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, and after reviewing
cases involving the question of "due process," where the act
had been sustained, says:
"The principle involved in these decisions is that where
the legislative action is arbitrary and has no reasonable
relation to a purpose which it is competent for govern-
ment to effect, the legislature transcends the limits of its
power in interfering with liberty of contract; but where
there is reasonable relation to an object within the govern-
mental authority, the exercise of the legislative discretion
is not subject to judicial review."
This statement says nothing until it has been determined what
is meant by "a purpose which it is competent for government
to effect," and by "within the governmental authority." In
'In Lochner v. New York (igo5) 198 U. S. 45, at 53 Mr. Justice Peck-
ham, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "There are, however,
certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each State in the Union,
somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limita-
tion of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers,
broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific
limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
the public. Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable condi-
tions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State in the
exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not designed to interfere."
' (I911) 219 U. S. 549.
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McLean v. Arkansas,3 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the court,
said:
"If there existed a condition of affairs concerning
which the legislature of the State, exercising its conceded
right to enact laws for the protection of the health, safety
or welfare of the people, might pass the law, it must be
sustained; if such action was arbitrary interference with
the right to contract or carry on business, and having
no just relation to the protection of the public within the
scope of legislative power, the act must fail."
A critical examination of the first part of this statement shows
it to be quite as meaningless and useless as a reference to the
"police power." The court says the act must be sustained, if
a condition of affairs existed (i) concerning which the legisla-
ture of the state might pass the law, (2) in the exercise of its
conceded right to enact laws for the protection of the health,
safety, or welfare of the people. Noiv who would doubt that,
with these conditions and premises assumed under which the
law must be valid, it would be sustained? - Take the second half
of the above statement. The act must fail (i) if such action
was an arbitrary interference with the right to contract or carry
on business, (2) and having no just relation to the protection
of the public within the scope of legislative power. Well, who
can doubt that an act about which all these self-proving asser-
tions are trie would be invalid? Such statements reveal noth-
ing. The opinions of the court are filled with statements of as
little value as these.
Then it has been asserted that an act of the legislature is, in
and of itself, "due process" if the deprivation of liberty or
property has any substantial and rational or reasonable relation
to the promotion of the health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare of the public or any part of the public.
4 Conversely it is
3(i9o9) 211 U. S. 539, 548.
'In Riley v. Massachusetts (1914) 232 U. S. 671, 679, Mr. Justice
McKenna, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The prohibition
of the statute under review, it is said, 'is not restricted to times and
places which relate to and naturally and logically affect a woman's health,
safety or morals or the welfare of herself or the public.' Such are the
conditions necessary to the validity of a statute, restricting employment,
it is contended, and that those conditions are not satisfied by the statute."
Mr. Frankfurter, in his brief for the State in the Oregon Minimum
Wage Case, Stettler v. O'Hara, U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1916, said:
"The validity of the Oregon statute must therefore be sustained unless
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said, if the act is arbitrary, i e., if it has no such relation to
any of those objects-it is void. Along with this statement goes
the administrative rule that no act is to be declared uncon-
stitutional unless it is clearly so, "beyond a reasonable doubt"-
some courts have said beyond a "rational doubt." This has been
declared to mean that the "violation of a constitutional right
ought to be as obvious to the comprehension of everyone as an
axiomatic truth, as that the parts are equal to the whole"; and
that "the validity of the law ought not then to be questioned
unless it is so obviously repugnant to the constitution that when
pointed out by the judges, all men of sense and reflection in the
community may perceive the repugnancy."8  This certainly
means that if an intelligent judge in the court of last resort may
rationally think that the act in question has a substantial and
rational, or reasonable relation to the health, safety, morals or
welfare of the public or any part of the public, and in fact does
so regard the act, it must be held valid. The question is not
whether each judge individually thinks the act has a substantial
'the Court can find that there is no 'fair ground, reasonable in and of
itself, to say that there is material danger to the public health (or safety),
or to the health (or safety) of the employees (or to the general welfare),
if the hours of labor are not curtailed.' Lochner v. New York (19o5)198 U3. S., 45, 61."
In State v. Clausen (i911) 117 Pac. (Wash.) iioi, sustaining the Wash-
ington Industrial Insurance Act, the court said: "If, therefore, the act
in controversy has a reasonable relation to the protection of the public
health, morals, safety, or welfare, it is not to be set aside because it
may incidentally deprive some person of his property without fault or
take the property of one person to pay the obligations of another. To
be fatally defective in these respects, the regulation must be so utterly
unreasonable and so extravagant in nature and purpose as to capriciously
interfere with and destroy private rights."
'J. B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law (1893) 7 HARv. L. REv. i29, 138-142.
'In Ex parte M'Collum (1823) i Cow. (U. S.) 550, 564, Cowen, J.
(for the court), said: "Before the court will deem it their duty to
declare an Act of the legislature unconstitutional, a case must be presented
in which there can be no rational doubt." In the Sinking Fund Cases
(1878) 99 U. S. 700, Mr. Chief Justice Waite, for the court, said: "This
declaration [that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional] should never
be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in favor
of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown
beyond a rational doubt"
SGrimball v. Ross (i8o8) Charlton (Ga.) 175.'Adn'rs of Byrne v. Adi'rs of Stewart (1812) 3 Des. (S. C.) 466.
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and rational or reasonable relation to the objects mentioned,
but whether an intelligent fellow-member of the bench may
rationally think that it does.
It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court of the United
States spends any time in serious debate over the application of
such a formula. Acts have, indeed, been held to be "due pro-
cess" because the court could not say that they did not have a
substantial or rational or reasonable relation to the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the public, or some part of the public.
9
But the formula is, nevertheless, quite worthless because some
acts which intelligent judges may regard as falling within it
have been held invalid, showing that there is a limitation upon
the legislative power which is not at all expressed.
In Lochner v. New York,"0 where the ten-hour law for bakers
was held void, the act had some relation to the health of persons
employed in bakeries, and four judges out of nine thought this
was a substantial and rational or reasonable relation. Since
intelligent men could take that view, the case must have been
decided upon the basis that such was the fact, and that it was
not sufficient to sustain the act. So in Adair v. United States,"
and Coppage v. State of Kansas,
2 acts which forbade employers
to discharge employees because they belonged to a union, were
held void. These acts clearly had a relation to the general wel-
fare of employees (and not unlikely to the public as well) by
promoting the existence of unions and collective bargaining
between employees 2jnd employers. The dissenting opinions make
it clear that intelligent men could regard such a relation as
substantial and rational or reasonable. The decision must, there-
fore, go on the ground that this was insufficient to sustain the
act. In Smith v. Te. as,13 an act which prohibited any person
from acting as a conductor on a railroad train without having
for two years prior either worked as a brakeman or conductor
9 In McLean v. Arkansas (i9o9) 211 U. S. 539, at 550, Mr. Justice Day
in delivering the opinion of the court said: "We are unable to say .
that this law had no reasonable relation to the protection of a large
class of laborers in the receipt of their just dues and the promotion of
the harmonious relations of capital and labor engaged in a great industry
in the state."
10 (o5) 198 U. S. 45.
(i9o8) 208 U. S. 161.
(1915) 236 U. S. i.
13 (1914) 233 U. S. 63o.
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on a freight train, was held void. This act clearly had a rela-
tion to the efficiency of conductors, and, therefore, to the safety
of the public and other employees. Again, the dissent indicates
that intelligent men might regard this relation as substantial and
rational or reasonable. The case, therefore, goes on the ground
that in spite of such a situation the act is void. In Chic. Mil. &
St. P. R. R. v. Wisconsin,14 an act which required the railroad
company to leave the upper berth up when it had not been dis-
posed of and the lower berth was occupied, was held void. This
act had some relation to the convenience and comfort of the
public. The dissent makes it clear that intelligent men could
regard this relation as substantial and rational or reasonable.
The decision, therefore, must go, upon the ground that rational
opinion that such a relation existed is insufficient to sustain the
act.
In Lochner v. New York,1 5 the court puts a number of hypo-
thetical cases where it concedes the act would have had a rela-
tion to the health of employees, and where intelligent men might
regard the relation as substantial and rational or reasonable, and
where, nevertheless, the act must be regarded as beyond the
power of the legislature. It is assumed by the court that an act
prohibiting lawyers or bank clerks or others from contracting
to labor for their employers more than eight hours a day would
be invalid, although it might rationally be said by intelligent men
that the work of such employees was carried on in offices lighted
by artificial light and was therefore unhealthy, and that such
an act had reference to the public health. It is assumed by the
court also that acts regulating the hours of labor of employers
and acts forbidding doctors, lawyers, scientists, and other pro-
fessional men as well as athletes and artisans to fatigue their
brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise would be
invalid, although intelligent men might rationally think such acts
would have a relation to the strength, robustness and fighting
qualities of the population in which the state is vitally inter-
ested. In the argument on the Adamson Act one of the justices
asked counsel for the government if an act of Congress which
voted- Mr. Debs $5o,ooo,ooo to call off a railroad strike would
be valid. Counsel answered that it would! This was a clear
reductio ad absurdum of his position that any act, which an
14 (1915) 238 U. S. 491.
I (19o5) i98 U. S. 45.
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intelligent man might rationally think had any substantial and
rational, or reasonable relation to the public safety, or general
welfare would be valid. Imagine arguing that an act which
abolished all interstate railroad transportation was valid because
an intelligent man might rationally think it had a substantial
and rational, or reasonable relation to the public safety, or the
safety of the employees, since so many thousands of the public
and the railroad employees were killed or maimed every year
as a result of interstate railroad transportation, and because
learned scientists and statisticians had made it plain that, while
such losses might be reduced, they must always occur. Imagine
anyone solemnly arguing that an act abolishing the steel industry,
or coal, iron, and copper mining would be valid for similar
reasons. Imagine anyone attempting to sustain an act legis-
lating out of existence our entire industrial system and requir-
ing a reversion to primitive agricultural conditions, because,
forsooth, some intelligent man could rationally think the act had
a relation to the safety and health of the public and employees!
It does not require any great degree of insight to perceive
that the continuance of railroad transportation, the steel and
mining industries, and indeed the whole modem scheme of
industrial and commercial organization, is essential and neces-
sary to the existence of our social order. These, and many other
activities, must go on, no matter if thousands do lose their
lives, and their health, and their morals every year as a result,
and must continue to do so.
If the test of "due process" is whether a majority of the
court individually think that the act has a substantial and
rational or reasonable relation to the safety, health, morals, or
welfare of the public, br any part of the public, then what are
the criteria for determining whether the "substantial and
rational" or "reasonable" relation exists? With reference to
what views is the reasonableness of the relation in question or its
substantial quality to be determined? When the court frequently
splits on whether there is such a "reasonable" or "substantial"
relation, it is clear that these criteria are of the utmost impor-
tance. That the court has failed to articulate them is clear from
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Lochner
case. 6 He says (speaking, it is assumed, of whether an act is
"due process" or not) :
o (1905) I8 U. S. 45, 76.
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"The decisions will depend on a judgment or intuitionmore subtle than any articulate major premise."
A moment later in the same opinion we have the concession
that there may be some fundamentals which the legislature
cannot touch:
"I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amend-ment is perverted when it is held to prevent the naturaloutcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said thata rational and fair man necessarily would admit that thestatute proposed would infringe fundamental Principlesas they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law."
Here is the whole story behind the failure of all formulae con-nected with "due process" and all the meaningless and circular
statements as to what acts are and what are not "due process."
In determining whether an act has a substantial and rational orreasonable relation to the enumerated matters, the court has inmind a background of "fundamental principles" which arebeyond the reach of any legislative power. What these are andhow they affect the question of the substantial or reasonable
relation of the act to the enumerated objects depends upon "ajudgment or intuition, more subtle than any articulate majorpremise." They are indeed the inarticulate major premise itself.
Progress in determining whether the command of the legis-lature is, or is not, in and of itself "due process of law" willbe made only when less reliance is placed upon mere "judg-
ment" or "subtle intuitions," and more upon the effort toexpound and articulate what is now "the inarticulate majorpremise." Who is to do this? The court evidently does notintend seriously to try. Just because, if it spoke, its utterance
would be authoritative and binding for the future, perhaps itshould not attempt to do so. The task will, therefore, fall uponthose who are outside the judicial conference chamber and who
speak without authority even when they speak what for thetime being may approximate the truth. They must speculate
about the matter as best they can. In order that a start may bemade in such speculations, the following are submitted.
"DUE PROCESS"
II
SUGGESTIONS FOR A TEST
It is hardly open to question that the fundamental principles
and the inarticulate major premise to which Mr. Justice Holmes
refers are in part at least the fundamental principles of thought
and action upon which the existence of our social structure rests.
The court does not deal with matters of legislative expediency.
It concedes that legislation which is merely unwise is not for
that reason void. It deals with questions of power. It must
be that the inarticulate major premise in the test of what is
"due process" has to do with such serious and ultimate matters
as the fundamentals of our social order. Only such as these
are to be protected by the court from the exercise of the
legislative power. The articulation of the major premise most
probably consists in putting into intelligible words the ideas
for the time being of the judges as to what are the fundamentals
of the social order Which must be placed beyond the reach of
the legislature. There is, of course, a difficulty about articulat-
ing for the judges what they do not publicly articulate for them-
selves and for us. With the aid, however, of a "judgment"
and a "subtle intuition" which ought not to be the exclusive
attribute of the judicial office, the following attempt is made to
state some of the fundamentals of the social order as, it is
conceived, they may lie in the minds of the majority of the
judges.
Society rests upon success in commerce and industry. Even
agriculture tends to become industrial. The social structure
depends for its life tpon what people are doing for the most
part from six o'clock in the morning to six o'clock at night.
For the running of the social structure there are two classes
of people-the individual labor unit and the individual managing
unit. The industrial population may be seen as an army of
workers, the many being the rank and file, known as the labor
units; and the officers being the managing units. If "labor
and capital" means anything, it means the division of the popula-
tion into labor units and managing units. The world is run by
labor, whichever kind it may be.
In an army the authority of the officers rests upon physical
coercion enforced by the rank and fife pursuant to the orders of
officers or leaders. In this commercial and industrial organiza-
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tion of society, authority rests upon the attributes of the private
ownership of property. These arise and are protected in the
first instance, at least, by governmental sanction. Ultimately they
rest upon the support and approval of the rank and file; namely,
the labor and managing units of all classes. The managers
own the property, or they represent the owners, and wield the
power which that ownership confers.
The managers in this industrial and commercial organization
of society are selected upon a competitive basis. Men com-
pete to become the managers of business. It may appear to the
unthinking as if they competed for money. This is not really
so. They compete for success in the management of property.
That success means the making of profits, and the rewards of
successful management are naturally measured in terms of pri-
vately owned property. But the successful manager controls
vastly more property than he can own or acquire. As more
property is created or its value is enhanced it still remains in
the hands of the manager class. Many owners of property are
retired managers, or the first, second, or third generation from
some successful super-manager whose rewards were large
enough to remain together for a considerable time. But the
control of property (whoever owns it) remains in the active
managers and must remain there in order to confer that author-
ity and power which the managers require in order to attain
successful management. Even when the labor units engaged
in a given enterprise wish to own and run it, they must own the
property necessary. They must delegate the power which that
ownership confers, upon managers and leaders who can do the
managing successfully and exercise the authority necessary for
successful management.
The unionization of labor units if carried to completion means
only that a new class of managers will have been created. For-
merly the managers of property were the managers of such labor
units as were required in their business. Under the labor
leader, labor units are combined, and the labor manager takes
the place of the manager of the plant employing labor. The
property manager then deals with the labor manager as the
manufacturer of steel products deals with the manufacturer of
his raw material. He buys his labor through the labor managers
as he would buy his raw material through the steel corporation.
If both were managed with equal skill and fairness he would
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no more think of asking that the labor manager be abolished,
than he would ask that the steel corporation manager be 
abol-
ished and the business of manufacturing steel be disrupted. 
The
difficulty, however, in the development of the labor 
manager
is that he has no source of authority except the immediate 
con-
sent and acquiescence of the labor units themselves. 
The state,
as yet, gives him no aid through the specific performance 
of
agreements with the labor units, or the enforcement of 
the rules
of the labor organization. As a practical matter the 
labor
manager, with the consent or acquiescence of the main body 
of
labor units, resorts, not infrequently, to what is now unauthor-
ized force against individuals to enforce-the rules promulgated
by the labor manager himself. To legalize this involves 
the
exercise of the authority of the state specifically to enforce
contracts between labor units and the labor managers. That
means approximately the same sort of slavery for the labor
unit as now exists for inanimate property. That is the difficulty,
not the solution.
There are three paramount evils in the present commercial
and industrial organization of society. They are the selfish-
ness, and the stupidity of the managers, and the fact that 
the
rewards of successful managing are in many cases out of 
all
proportion to what the managers are willing to work for.
Considered de novo, the legislative power is the legitimate
means of correcting mistakes of persistent stupidity and short-
sighted selfishness on the part of the managers. It is the legiti-
mate means of compelling all to do that which the wiser are
ready to do, but the more stupid and the more selfish are
unwilling to attempt, and, therefore, not infrequently prevent
action by any. The lgislative power is the legitimate means
of cutting down the rewards of successful management so 
that
they are not out of all proportion to what the successful manager
is willing to take. So far as the legislation in question tends
to accomplish these objects, it should be sustained. On 
the
other hand, so far as it tends to substitute a legislative fiat 
for
the judgment of the managers, and thereby place the manage-
ment of our industrial and commercial units in the hands 
of
the legislature-so far as it tends to undermine the manager's
chances and motives for successful management, or to impair
the competitive system by which the managers are selected, 
or
to interfere with the ownership and distribution of private
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property by which the manager's authority is maintained, thelegislation in question is a menace to the social structure, and,therefore, inimical to the general welfare and should be con-demned. What the court obviously has to do is to balancethese opposing tendencies of any given legislation and to deter-
mine its predominant effect. If its predominant effect is thatof correcting the mistakes of persistent stupidity and short-
sighted selfishness on the part of the managers, it should bevalid. If its predominant effect is that of reversing somefundamental principle upon which the social order rests, it
should be void.
On the whole the actual results reached by the court justify
this line of distinction.
Why, for instance, if the act be confiscatory, is it held to benot "due process ?" It is not simply that confiscation is abhor-
rent. There is no objection to prohibiting the liquor business
and thereby causing loss which in general would be regarded asconfiscatory. It is because confiscation destroys business. Itprohibits business by making it unprofitable. When, therefore,
the business is one required by, or consistent with, the exigencies
of the social order-as distinguished from the liquor business-
an act prohibiting it, whether directly or by confiscatory bur-dens, is not "due process." Assuming, therefore, that themanufacture and sale of oleomargarine is a legitimate business,dealing in a wholesome and useful article of food to the increas-
ing many who cannot afford to buy butter, its absolute prohibi-
tion would not be "due process." Even if there were dangerof fraud by the substitution of oleomargarine for butter, never-
theless, in balancing the importance to society now and here-after, of permitting a useful and legitimate business in animportant article of food to be carried on free from the con-
fiscatory action of the legislature, against the desirability ofeliminating by the entire prohibition of the business, all danger
of deception, the former consideration should certainly prevail.
The result reached by the New York Court of Appeals in theMarx case,1 7 holding such an act void, is sound. The opposite
conclusion reached by the United States Supreme Court in thePowell case, 8 is plainly the result of a failure to balance theinterests correctly. The court took in the danger of fraud uponthe few and forgot the danger of malnutrition to the many.
'People v. Marx (1885) 99 N. Y. 377.'3Powell v. Pennsylvania (I888) 127 U. S. 678.
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A number of acts plainly interfering with business, sustained
by the United States Supreme Court as "due process," are
given by the court itself in a recent opinionP: legislation limit-
ing employment in underground mines or workings, and in
smelters and other institutions for the reduction or refining of
ores or metals, to eight hours a day except in cases of emerg-
ency20 ; legislation requiring the redemption in cash of store
orders or other evidence of indebtedness issued in payment 
of
wages21 ; legislation prohibiting the employment of women 
in
laundries more than ten hours a day
22 ; legislation making it
unlawful to contract to pay miners employed at quantity rates
upon the basis of screened coal, instead of the weight of the
coal as originally produced in the mine.
22 The Supreme Court
has recently sustained the California act limiting the hours
of labor of women in certain employments to eight hours in
one day, or a maximum of forty-eight hours a week.
24  The
court has sustained two Arkansas statutes,
25 requiring full train
crews for railroad trains. In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
26
the court sustained the validity of the Oklahoma Act subjecting
state banks to assessments for a depositors' guarantee 
fund.
All these acts in a degree interfere with the managers' freedom
to inanage according to their judgment and opportunity. 
All
in a degree tend to substitute the legislative fiat for the will 
of
the managers. They tend to some extent to undermine 
the
managers' chances and motives for successful mariagement. 
At
the same time they tend to counteract the persistent stupidity
and short-sighted selfishness of the managers themselves. 
They
tend to compel all alike to do what the more enlightened 
are
willing to concede is for the best interests of the business. 
They
tend to compel that co-operation or common action by 
all the
members of a group, which is desirable in the interests 
of the
business itself as well as the general welfare, but which 
cannot
be obtained without the compulsion of law, because some 
at
Chicago, B. & Quincy R. R. Co. v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549, 
568.
Holden v. Hardy (1898) I69 U. S. 366.
'Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (igoi) 183 U. S. 13.
'Muller v. Oregon (9o8) 208 U. S. 412.
McLean v. Arkansas (1909) 211 U. S. 539.
2 Miller v. Wilson (1915) 236 U. S. 373; Bosley v. McLaughlin (1915)
236 U. S. 385.
Chic. Burl. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire (i911) 219 U. S. 549.
'(1911) 219 U. S. 104.
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least would never subscribe to the plan voluntarily. The latter
tendencies fixed the predominant effect of the acts in ques-
tion, and they were, upon the balancing of the interests,
sustained.
This method of analysis is especially well illustrated in the
Oklahoma Depositors' Guarantee Fund case. The act under
consideration there assessed all the state banks for a guarantee
fund to pay the depositors of any bank that failed. From the
point of view of the individual successful banker, this was an
unconscionable interference with his business. It compelled himto support his weak competitors. It required the successful
to maintain the credit of the unsuccessful, or less successful,
competitor. This attitude, however, furnishes an excellent
example of persistent stupidity and short-sighted selfishness. The
success of banks and the banking business as a whole depends
upon stability and security of depositors. It is that which brings
in the depositors from local and distant sources as well as
from the stocking and from the safe. Of such overwhelming
importance is this stability and security of depositors to the
banking business, that in times of failure and panic in great
banking centers, the strong banks in their own interests have
felt compelled to step in and protect depositors. Is it an over-
statement to characterize as stupid and short-sightedly selfish
the refusal of individuals to recognize this fact, and their insist-
ence that the continued failure of weak banks was a benefit
to the strong ones and to the banking business in general?
Yet such an attitude was certain to continue on the part of many
individuals engaged in the banking business, until some unusual
course of events demonstrated their folly. Co-operative effort
to achieve stability and security in the banking business for its
own advantage would, therefore, be indefinitely postponed.
Under such circumstances, the legislature steps in to make pos-
sible at once that which is for the best interests of the business
itself, by compelling those to co-operate who would otherwise
refuse to do so. It is not advisable to lay the principal stress
on the benefit of the legislation in question to the public apart
from the benefit to the business. A benefit to the public which
hurt the business would in the long run be a delusion and
against the public welfare. If the act assists the business and at
the same time benefits the public-indeed, if it assists the busi-
ness because -it benefits the public-its predominant effect is
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such as to require it, on any theory of balancing of interests, to
be sustained.
On the other hand, the moment the predominant effect of the
act was to substitute legislative managing for the managing by
competitively selected industrial leaders, or to substitute legisla-
tive selection of managers for competitive selection, it was held
void.
In the Lochner case,27 an act limiting to ten hours a day the
hours of labor for bakers was held void. The majority individ-
ually thought that the act had no "substantial and rational" or
"reasonable" relation to the health or welfare of the public or
any part of the public, because upon a balancing of the interests
affected, its predominant effect was to substitute a legislative
fiat for the judgment of the managers in the baking industry.
There was no showing that this judgment was so persistently
stupid and short-sightedly selfish as to justify the interference
of the legislature in the management of the business.
In the Adair28 and Coppage
29 cases, acts which forbade employ-
ers to discharge employees because they belonged to a union
were held void. These acts clearly attempted to substitute the
legislative fiat for the judgment of the managers in a most vital
matter; namely, what persons the managers should employ, and
on what terms employees should be retained. If sustained, the
way would be open for acts which would substitute the will of
the legislature for the judgment of labor managers as to when
employees should quit, or the terms upon which they should
work, or who should be employed at all. This last, by con-
trolling the group of workers from which managers must be
largely recruited, would jeopardize the competitive method of
selecting the managers themselves. What was there to weigh
against these serious objections to the act? Practically noth-
ing. The act had no relation to the health, morals, or safety
of anyone. It was hard to say that the managers, in so far
as they resisted the unionization of employees and collective
bargaining through labor managers, were persistently stupid and
short-sightedly selfish, and that for this reason their opposition
to unions should be curbed. Perhaps the time may come When
such opposition will be regarded as so stupid that it may be
"Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45.
'Adair v. United States (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. i6i.
Coppage v. State of Kansas (i915) 236 U. S. i.
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interfered with by the legislature. But evidently no case of
that sort was made out to the satisfaction of the court. There
was, therefore, nothing to outweigh the considerations against
the acts. Their predominant effect was to violate fundamental
principles upon which the social order rests. They had, there-
fore, no "substantial and rational" or "reasonable' relation to
the public welfare and were consequently void.
In Smith v. Texas,o an act which prohibited any person from
acting as a conductor on a railroad train without having for
two years prior either worked as a brakeman or conductor on a
freight train, was held void. The legislation here involved was
a very obvious regulation of the conditions upon which men
were employed. It had, of course, some connection with the
efficiency of conductors, and, therefore, with the safety of the
public. At the same time it was apparent that upon a balancing
of interests, the safety of passengers and employees, to be pro-
moted by securing, by means of this act, more efficient con-
ductors, was slight as compared with the setting aside by the
legislature of the fundamental principle that industrial and com-
mercial leaders shall be selected by the competitive method.
Such competitive selection cannot be accomplished unless the
avenues of promotion remain open. The predominant effect
of the act was clearly to substitute the action of the legisla-
ture for the competitive method in the selection of managers.
Hence, the act had no "substantial and rational" or "reason-
able" relation to the public safety. That this was the precise
ground of the court's decision appears from the following lan-
guage of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Lamar:
"If the statute can fix the class from which conductors
on freight trains shall be taken, another statute could
limit the class from which brakemen and conductors on
passenger trains could be selected, and so, progressively,
the whole matter, as to who could enter the railroad ser-
vice and who could go from one position to another, wouldbe regulated by statute. In the nature of the case, promo-
tion is a matter of private business management, and
should be left to the carrier company, which bound toserve the public, is held to the exercise of diligence inselecting competent men, and responsible in law for theacts of those who fill any of these positions."
(i914) :233 U. S. 63o.
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In Chic. Mil. & St. P. R. R. v. Wiscoisin,31 the Supreme
Court held void an act which required upper berths in sleep-
ing cars, when not engaged, to be left up. This had some relation
to the convenience of the travelling public. On the other side,
however, the act was a clear substitution of the legislative will
for the judgment of railroad managers in the matter of running
sleeping cars. Nor was any case made that the act was justified
by the persistent stupidity or short-sighted selfishness of the
sleeping car managers. On the contrary there was evidence
that the convenience and welfare of travellers was served in
some degree by the practice of putting the upper berth down
whether engaged or not. No case was, therefore, made against
the act. The court said:
"The right of the State to regulate public carriers in
the interest of the public is very great. But that great
power does not warrant an unreasonable interference
with the right of management or the taking of the carrier's
property without compensation."
Mr. Frankfurter's argument in support of the Oregon Ten-
Hour Law for Men3 2 in certain occupations and the Oregon
Minimum Wage Act for Women,33 really proceeds upon the dis-
tinction suggested. He has to admit at once, of course, that the
acts in question interfere to a considerable extent with the
manager's freedom in bargaining with labor as to the terms of
employment. The legislature is in some degree at least substitu-
ting its fiat for the judgment of the managers of industry. The
real difficulty is in the attempt to show on the other side, that
the managers are persistently stupid and short-sightedly selfish
in not adopting these very measures; that by their adoption the
industry itself would be better served, production increased, and
employees and employers both more prosperous and better satis-
fied; that the more enlightened managers are ready to take
these very steps, when all alike are required to do so; that
because some will not take the steps required by the legislation
in question, practically all are prevented from doing so. If this
position could be maintained, on the facts, the court would be
"1 (1915) 238 U. S. 491.
'Bunting v. Oregon (Apr. 9, 1917) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, x16.
No. 38.
' Stettler v. O'Hara, U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, I916.
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bound to say that its predominant effect was to uphold the
social order and the general welfare and not to destroy it. It
would, therefore, say the acts in question did have a substantial
and rational or reasonable relation to the public health and
welfare and were valid.s
3 a
III
FUNCTION OF THE COURT IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION
OF "CDUE PROCESS"
The function of the Supreme Court in exercising a veto upon
legislation which tends to imperil the fundamentals of the social
structure is not unique. The judicial method of performing the
function may be unusual, but the function itself is not unknown
in well regulated modem democracies. England which has con-
stantly been held up to us as a government in which Parliament
is omnipotent; and where courts do not declare laws unconsti-
tutional, furnishes a striking example of the existence of this
function. In the omnipotence of Parliament is involved the
concurrence of the House of Lords. That body is made up
principally of the representatives of property and business
interests. One of its chief functions has been to see that the
popular assembly did not overturn the fundamentals of the exist-
ing social order. In England, therefore, you will find in place of
our Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and our Supreme Courts
declaring acts of Congress and of the states unconstitutional,
a second chamber directly representing property and business
interests and having, until recently at least, an absolute veto upon
the acts of the popularly elected House. Such second chambers
are naturally unpopular, and fail sooner or later. They fail if
they do not perform this function of standing between the popu-
lar will and the fundamentals of the social structure. They are
quite likely to fail if they do. When the fundamentals of the
social order change, a second chamber which persists in protect-
ing the fundamentals of the past which no longer exist, must,
temporarily at least, be set aside. The Supreme Court of the
United States, through its power to declare laws unconstitu-
'a Since this article went to press the Oregon Ten Hour Law for Men
has been sustained by the United States Supreme Court by a vote of five
to three. The Oregon Minimum Wage Act for Women was sustained
by an evenly divided court, no opinion being rendered.
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tional in obedience to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is
our substitute for a second legislative chamber for the United
States and the states. The function which it performs is a
necessary and proper one in all governments where the legisla-
tive power is wielded by a popularly elected assembly or assem-
blies. When the function of the court is exercised faithfully,
the court must incur unpopularity. If the court did not become,
to some extent at least, unpopular, there would be raised a sus-
picion that it was not performing one of its most important
functions. So long, however, as the court confines itself to the
protection of the actual fundamentals of our social order from
assault by the majority, its continued support by the majority is
to be expected.
It has been asserted that because the court cannot apply force
to the carrying out of its judgments, its function in declaring
laws unconstitutional should be curbed to the vanishing point.
All second chambers are weak. Physically they are helpless.
The House of Lords could not originate a budget or control
expenditures. It did not control the Army or the Navy. It
exercised its power neither by force, nor the suggestion of
force, but by reason of the respect of Englishmen for a consti-
tutional authority and by virtue of the social prestige of its
members, their ownership of property and success in the com-
mercial and industrial world. It is desirable that second cham-
bers should be weak, so far as the control of force is concerned.
Such weakness is the best guaranty that the members will use
their heads and not their arms. Our Supreme Court similarly
maintains its position, and the exercise of its most important
function, because of the respect in which we hold constitutional
authority, and our belief in the integrity and fairness of the
judiciary; and perhaps also because the judges are not the
leaders of the business world and the owners of property, but
are regarded as having a superior habit of judicial insight.
Up to this point stress has been laid upon the fact that our
Supreme Court exercises much the same function in our state
and federal governments that the House of Lords does in
England. It is time to point out that the method of its exercise
is very different. The House of Lords considers the act before
it can be enforced by public officers as law. It is entitled to
exercise its veto upon any ground and is bound by no rule of
stare decisis. It may act like any legislative chamber in propos-
ing amendments. Our Supreme Court, on the other hand, func-
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tions only after the act has presumably become law and is
being enforced. Furthermore, it vetoes or sustains the act as
a whole, or in part if it be separable. It has no power to act
like a second legislative chamber in proposing amendments. But
most important of all, it attempts to proceed like a court in
accordance with general principles. It looks to its past decisions
and to a proposed decision as creating a legalistic generalization.
This may cause an act, insignificant in scope and extent when
taken by itself, to fall within a generalization which will cause
the act to fail. For instance, the act requiring conductors on
railroads to be selected only from those who had served as
brakemen,34 might, in and of itself, be regarded as harmless.
Yet sustaining it would have established a generalization that
the legislature had a free hand to interfere with our industrial
and commercial system, with the way in which its leaders man-
age, and the competitive struggle by which leaders are selected.
The argument that sustaining a given act leads to a generaliza-
tion which cannot be permitted, should be distinguished from
the discredited argument based upon abuse of power. With
the abuse of power, the court does not attempt to deal. It is the
generalized definition of power which the court is supposed to
elucidate.
The effort of courts in declaring laws unconstitutional to act
in all respects like a court exercising its judicial function has
broken down in one important respect. The court, while it is
very wary not to make a decision that will lead to a generaliza-
tion which is not permissible, is very careful not to proceed
according to any generalization of its own. This is only reas-
serting the main point of this article, that in the definition of
what is "due process" the court leaves the major premise
always inarticulate. That means that there can be no author-
itative and usable generalization about what is, or what is not,
"due process." To leave the major premise inarticulate and to
reach results on "judgment" or "intuition" is just a scheme
for not having any rule of law or legal generalization which is
susceptible of application. It is a device for leaving the court
with a wide discretion to do what it thinks best. The court
hardly takes this position because it feels unable to articulate
the major premise. It is undoubtedly difficult to do so, but it
is not impossible. Certainly it is not impossible to make some
" Sinith v. Texas (1914) 233 U. S. 63o.
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progress toward that end. The real objection is that it would
involve a reference to what the court must regard as the funda-
mentals of the social order, and particular cases would begin to
elucidate what those were. The decisions would, if treated like
other judicial decisions, have an effect as stare decisis. Every
opinion on a question of "due process" would tend to become
a law.8 5 This would be most inconvenient, because the court
might make a mistaken decision as to what was a fundamental
of the social order, or in a period of time, what the court had
held to be a fundamental of the social order, might change, or
it might more clearly be perceived that it was not a fundamental
at all. With prior decisions being adhered to and followed on
the principle of stare decisis, the rules as to what the legislature
could not do might become too rigid and inflexible and result
in a justifiable dissatisfaction with the court and its function.
On the other hand, so long as the major premise remains inarticu-
late, the court has a free hand in spite of the rule of stare decisis
to give effect at all times to what it regards as the dominant
opinion with respect to what are the fundamentals of the social
order. These considerations require the court either to give up
the doctrine of stare decisis in cases involving "due process"
or to leave the major premise inarticulate. It is submitted that
it would be better to take the former step, and then speak with
more reality and freedom in opinions, so that the majoqr premise
might become, to a greater degree, articulate. It is hardly fair,
by wilfully leaving the major premise inarticulate, practically
to abrogate in this class of cases the principle of stare decisis
also.
The fact that the major premise is left inarticulate explains
very clearly the non-existence or futility of the rule of adminis-
tration which Professor Thayer so strongly insisted upon;
namely, that an act of the legislature should only be declared
unconstitutional when it appeared to be so, clearly and beyond
a reasonable doubt, or beyond a rational doubt.
3 6  So long as the
major premise remains inarticulate, how can anyone ever say that
there is any reasonable or rational doubt concerning the result
reached by any majority which holds the act unconstitutional?
"In Lochner v. New York (19o5) i98 U. S. 45, Mr. Justice Holmes
said in his dissenting opinion: "Every opinion tends to become a law."
" See J. B. Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law (1898) 7 H.ARv. L. REv. 129, 138-142.
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If the majority proceeds upon one inarticulate major premise
and the minority upon another, it may be that no intelligent man
acting rationally would differ from either. If all the members
of the court adopted the same major premise the entire court
might agree. If, when the major premise becomes articulate,
it involves a balancing of the interests-as when the effect of
an act in interfering with the freedom of the managers to
manage is weighed against the stupidity and selfishness of the
managers-there is little room for the operation of any rule
that if two men, acting rationally, differ, the act must be sus-
tained. With such a major premise, judges must decide the
way they estimate the evidence and the way they balance the
interests. Each might say, that if he personally had any doubt-
if the considerations were equally balanced-the act must, in his
opinion, be sustained. But it would be quite unthinkable that a
judge should sustain the act because a fellow-member of the
bench, in balancing the interests, came to the conclusion that the
act was valid. Such a rule would mean that every act would
be sustained if one judge out of nine could rationally say that
upon balancing the interests, those in favor of the act prevailed.
The judges plainly have never acted upon any such basis. On
the contrary, the constant dissents are explainable only on the
ground that different judges have adopted different inarticulate
premises or that they have, in fact, been balancing the interests,
and have not agreed as to the result reached in so doing.
If the function of the court had been to determine each case
by the application of a formula, the major premise of which
was articulate, the same act might have been brought up for
consideration in different cases under different records, present-
ing in each an entirely different case with respect to the applica-
tion of the major premise. At the same time when an act was
sustained through the efforts of the state in making a special
record on the evidence in one case, the act might fail when
attacked in the next case if no such record were made. This
would produce the anomaly of the act being sustained on one
record as between the state and one party, and held invalid
upon the record as between the state and another party. The
state would be kept busy constantly repeating the same evidence
in support of the act as often as it was attacked. Courts of last
resort would be kept busy examining records on the evidence and
considering much material introduced under the guise of sources
of which the court was asked to take judicial notice. The court
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might have to hear several different cases involving the same
act, each arising at a different time, and upon a different record
before the interests affected were satisfied that upon the rule
of stare decisis the act would be valid or invalid for everyone.
These inconveniences have been avoided to a considerable extent
by keeping the major premise inarticulate and rendering it
obscure that the court was really engaged in balancing the
interests. The legal profession under these circumstances has
generally thought that the case was fully presented when the
act was before the court with such facts as the court took judi-
cial notice of. Such a misconception, however, has militated
rather more against than for the validity of acts of the legisla-
ture. What the court took judicial notice of was usually val-
uable in showing that the act deprived someone of liberty or
property and interfered with the function of managers to con-
duct business according to their own judgment and opportunity.
The few who have been astute enough to appreciate the mis-
conception have had an advantage not possessed by the many.
This has operated, on the whole, to give an advantage to the
property interests seeking to set aside an act of the legislature
not possessed by those who represented the state.
If a business like that of manufacturing oleomargarine, or
baking powder containing alum were jeopardized by prohibitory
legislation, counsel attacking the act could be relied upon to
put in evidence proof that alum was a perfectly harmless sub-
stance in baking powder, or that oleomargarine was an entirely
healthy and proper article of food as the case might be. In the
Upper Berth case,3 7 counsel for the railroad were not above
introducing evidence and securing a finding of the trial court
"that the lowering of upper berths does not injure the lives,
health, or safety of persons occupying the lower berths and
that keeping the upper berth closed will not add to the comfort
of the public generally." But when hours of labor statutes have
been under consideration, those supporting the act seem, in the
general run of cases, not to have insisted as part of their case
upon a complete investigation of the industry affected, in order
to determine whether the managers were persistently stupid or
short-sightedly selfish in the hours of labor which they endeavored
to maintain. For instance, suppose an Eight-Hour Law for
Women in Factories-principally textile-were under considera-
' Chic. Mil. & St. P. R. R. v. Wisconsin (915) 238 U. S. 491.
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tion, would any state's attorney think to put in evidence, by
witnesses under oath, subject to cross-examination, the situation
in the locality where the law was operative as to the speeding
up of machines, or the concentration of attention required by
reason of new inventions in machines, or the larger number of
machines that a single operative was called upon to tend, in
order to demonstrate the far greater nervous strain upon the
operative at work in the mills than they were under a few years
.-ago? Counsel for the state, in the cases involving the Oregon
Ten-Hour Law for Women,3 8 the Oregon Ten-Hour Law for
Men,"0 and the Oregon Minimum Wage Law for Women, 40
only produced data and statistics which the court was asked to
take judicial notice of, and these had little to do with conditions
in Oregon.
The failure to articulate the major premise has, it must be
conceded, some administrative advantages, and the articulation
of the major premise is not without its administrative disadvan-
tages. If the major premise is to be made articulate, some
means must be devised by which the question of 'due process"
shall not be passed upon by any court without the presentation
to it of a proper record upon the issue involving the balancing
of interests. When such a record is once made, the finding upon
which the court proceeds should be admissible in all other pro-
ceedings involving the same issue and should be prima facie
evidence of the facts so found. This probably means that a per-
manent judicial officer must be attached to the courts, qualified
to make such investigations, equipped with resources to do so,
and having the power and the duty to proceed independently of
the parties as well as in connection with their efforts.
Nothing is gained by bickering over whether the court's action
in declaring legislation unconstitutional is political or judicial.
It might be called a political function on the ground that the
court, like second chambers generally, was protecting the funda-
mentals of society from the sudden assaults of a temporary
popular majority. One is bound, however, to concede that the
function of the court is exercised under some forms and limita-
tions which pertain to the judicial function. But when the major
premise of any test of "due process" remains inarticulate, so
'Muller v. Oregon (igo8) 208 U. S. 412.
'Bunting v. Oregon, supra.
' Stettler v. O'Hara, supra.
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that the court is not bound by any legal formula or generaliza-
tion, when no evidence is taken or record made to determine
whether the act in question falls within any legal formula or
generalization with regard to what is "due process," and when
judicial notice of facts, "judgment," "intuition," and visceral
sensations supply the place of the inarticulate major premise and
the application of it to the facts, the judicial aspect of the court's
function diminishes to the vanishing point, and the function
itself becomes suspiciously like that of the ideal legislator. If,
however, we agree that the court has a function, and what that
function is, and the mode of its exercise, we will have no need
to enter upon the futile dispute as to whether the function is
to be called one name rather than another. If we do not agree
what the court's function in fact is, or the mode of its exercise,
then emphasizing different names may only accentuate a dis-
agreement which should be made more plain and precise.
IV
APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING TO THE ADAMSON ACT
Without these preliminaries, or others upon similar lines, an
act like the Adamson Law canxnct he dealt with very intelligently.
With them such an act can be disposed of rather shortly.
If the act (without, however, being confiscatory) is one which
merely raises wages-as if it read that during eight months
from January ist the wages of all railway employees shall be
20 per cent higher than before-it would clearly be void. It
might be conceded that such an act had some relation to the
safety and general welfare of the public in a most vital particu-
lar; namely, in keeping its transportation service going. No
doubt intelligent men could regard the relation as rational and
substantial or reasonable. On the other side, it is clear that the
act strikes directly at one of the fundamentals of our social
structure; namely, the freedom of the leaders and managers of
industry to buy and sell labor or commodities at prices fixed by
economic conditions rather than by the fiat of the legislature.
This is the freedom of the leaders of industry to manage in
accordance with their judgment and opportunity, rather than in
accordance with the will of the legislature. When the two
effects of the act are balanced, it is clear that the predominant
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effect is to overturn a fundamental principle upon which the
social order rests. As a means of keeping the transportation
system of the country in operation, the act is temporary, and,
from the beginning, entirely speculative. So far as it lays open
to the unrestricted action of the legislature a fundamental of our
social structure, it is permanent.
It is true that the government might take over the owner-
ship of the railroads and fix wages on a political- basis instead
of an economic one, but while it leaves the railways in the hands
of private owners to be managed as private enterprises, it must
not impair any fundamental principle of the code upon which
such management rests. It has been suggested4' that the power
to regulate wages of railroad employees follows from the power
actually being exercised to regulate their rates. This entirely
overlooks the fact that the function of the court is based upon
the protection of the fundamentals of our industrial order from
the momentary acts of a popular majority. Hence, the fact that
the legislature has control of rates is a reason above all others
why it should not at the same time control wages. The control
of both, when added to all the regulation now indulged in, and
which may hereafter be indulged in, would mean practically gov-
ernment ownership without payment for the property and with-
out direct governmental responsibility for the management of
the roads. It would mean, that while refusing the responsibility
and the cost of government ownership, the legislature was
undertaking to disrupt the fundamental conditions upon which
alone private ownership and management can succeed.
If we look at the generalization regarding the power of
Congress and the state legislatures which must be approved if
an act fixing the wages of railway employees be sustained as
such, the difficulties of so holding consistently with the protec-
tion of the fundamentals of the social order from the power of
the legislature, becomes even more apparent. The narrowest
generalization would be that the legislature has power to fix
wages for all employees in the transportation service. But
no distinction could be made between railways and telephones
and telegraphs and other methods of communication by public
service corporations, so that the fixing of wages in the whole
field of the business of intercommunication, carried on by public
service corporations, would be open to the legislature. Further-
' (igi6) 30 HARV. L. REv. 63.
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more, no distinction could be made between the power to lower
and the power to advance wages. Such a power would be quite
as much a menace to the freedom of labor managers who control
the collective bargaining for the sale of labor, as it is to the
freedom of the managers of property who purchase labor. It
is clear also that so far as the fixing of wages is concerned, no
distinction is to be made between public service corporations
engaged in the business of transportation or communication, and
any other business. So far as the power to fix rates is con-
cerned, such a distinction has been made, but there is no ground
for making it, so far as the payment for labor or any other
commodity required is concerned. No distinction can be made
between the price of labor and the price of commodities. A
power to fix the price of labor would logically include the power
to fix the price of commodities. Thus if the Adamson Law be
looked upon as a wage-fixing act merely, the sustaining of it
would lead to the generalization that Congress has power (pro-
vided that the act be not confiscatory) to fix wages and prices
of commodities in every industry. Such a power, if exercised,
would certainly strike at the fundamentals of our present indus-
trial and commercial social order as they lie in the mind of the
court. The existence of such a power would open an unob-
structed way for an attack upon our social order by a majority
at any time. It is the business of the court to see that such a
path is obstructed. This is not an argument from the abuse of
power. It is an argument as to the extent of a power, which
the necessity of generalizing from a particular decision would
require the court to recognize if it sustained what was merely
a wage-fixing act.
Suppose, however, the Adamson Law "is not a mere wage-
fixing act at all, but an act to compel the railways to try an
experiment from which may be derived data to be used by them
and the unions in adjusting their bargaining as to wages, and by
the government and the public to guide them in their attitude or
course of action. If this were the predominant effect of the
act, then, if it were sustained, the generalization of the court
would be merely that the power of the legislature was not so
limited that it could not require an experiment for an appropriate
length of time for the purpose of securing the information in
question, and place the expense of the experiment (if not con-
fiscatory) upon the employer. Suppose such an experiment
would make good the manager's case. That would tend to head
41
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off government ownership and to promote compulsory arbitra-
tion in case the employees were persistent in their refusal to
accept the terms which the experiment showed to be equitable
and proper. Public opinion would be enlisted on the side of
the managers. The employees themselves would obviously be
more willing to come to the terms found by the experiment to
be just. Managers who would refuse an experiment bringing
in such returns would obviously be so stupid and short-sightedly
selfish as to need the prod of legislation to make them do what
was in their own interest. Suppose, however, the experiment
made a clear case against the managers. That would give the
managers information which they might not have possessed
before to aid them in their collective bargaining. It would
guide the public in the formation of its opinion.. It would give
the legislature much needed information to enable it to deter-
mine whether, if the railroad managers persisted in a refusal to
accede to just demands, government ownership might not be
necessary. In any event the public welfare-and indeed the
very social structure about which so much is here said-depends
upon its transportation system. An act, the predominant effect
of which is to require an experiment which will tend to prevent
the disruption of that system by furnishing the parties, public,
and the government with information, can hardly be condemned
on the ground that it is inimical to the social order itself.
2
It is submitted that the Adamson Law is not a mere wage-
fixing act but an act requiring an appropriate and reasonable
experiment to be made by the railroads, and is, therefore, in and
I In the recent case of State v. Public Service Commission (1917) 191
S. W. (Mo.) 412, the court sustained an order of the commission fixing
lower rates for a gas company temporarily, merely to make a test, in
order that the real question of a reasonable rate might ultimately be
determined. Here the commission which ordered the experiment had
power to fix rates. It was, therefore, securing information for the pur-
pose of carrying out its own power. Does it make any difference that
Congress secures information which cannot be used by it to fix wages?
Congress would have power to act upon the information obtained in other
ways than fixing wages, i. e., by taking steps toward government owner-
ship. The parties and the public will certainly act upon any information
obtained. Does not the government take a census in order to secure
information for general purposes? Does not the census act take the
liberty of those who are compelled to answer questions, and the liberty
and property of those who are imprisoned or fined for refusal to do so?
See U. S. Sts. at L. 61st Cong. Sess. I, chap. 2, secs. 23, 24.
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of itself, "due process of law." Several considerations make it
easy to reach this conclusion.
A general transportation strike was threatened. No one knew
what the merits of the controversy were. Apparently the sub-
ject matter of the dispute was so intricate that the legislature was
at least entitled to assume that no one could know without some
actual experiment being made. The act provides for an experi-
ment. In laying down the Eight-Hour day as the measure of
a day's pay, and requiring that wages be not reduced, it fixes
the general outlines of the experiment. Then the act provides
for the appointment of a commission to report upon the results
of the experiment within a reasonable and appropriate time,
that is to say, not less than six, nor more than nine months.
Thirty days after the report is in, the provision prohibiting a
reduction in wages comes to an end. The railroads may then
reduce wages as they please. The employees may strike, but
the public will have the commission's report to go upon. The
form and operation of the act is entirely consistent with the
theory that it provides only for an experiment which will give
important information to all parties in interest.
It will no doubt be argued that if the act merely directed an
experiment, why require the wages at the old rate to be paid
over to the employees? Why not merely hold up wages and
have them paid over at a future time if the commission found
they should be? There are several answers to this. First, any
such arrangement would have led to the charge that the act was
in fact a wage-fixing statute pure and simple, because it would
have provided after the experiment had been made, for the
payment over of the higher wage. Second, if the money were
not actually paid over at any time, the experiment would have
been a sort of moot case-a mere experiment in bookkeeping.
It would have lacked reality. As it is now, the wages which the
experiment calls for are actually to be paid over, not at all
because the legislature is fixing wages, but in order to make an
experiment, and to make it a real one, with all the readjustments
which such a change would naturally provoke.
It may be urged that it would have been fairer for the public
to pay the cost of the experiment, or to have required the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to raise rates in order to reimburse
the railways, in part at least, for the expense of the experiment.
Perhaps so! But Congress undertook to say that the cost of
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this experiment (except that of the commission and its incidental
expenses) should be borne by the railways themselves. The
court cannot say that the cost of such an experiment was im-
properly thrown upon the railroad. Once concede that such an
experiment is a proper subject of legislation so that the act may
itself be "due process" and the fact that the cost is thrown
on the railroad, is not different from the placing of the cost of
new methods of accounting or safety appliances on the railroad.
The railroad is protected, as far as it can be by the courts, by the
rule that the expenditures required shall not be confiscatory.
V
CONCLUSION
The following suggestions are made for the guidance of
lawyers engaged in dealing with the constitutionality of acts of
the legislature under the "due process" clause where the only
process is the mandate of the act itself:
(I) So far as "due process of law" is concerned, the only
limitation upon the legislature is that an act depriving any per-
son of liberty or property is void, when, upon the balancing of all
the interests, the predominant effect of the act is such that any
generalization resulting from sustaining it will open an unob-
structed way for attack by the legislature upon a fundamental
condition of the existence of the social order.
Perhaps the same idea may be stated more conventionally as
follows: Acts depriving any person of liberty or property are
arbitrary and void if they have no substantial and rational or
reasonable relation to the health, safety, morals, or welfare of
the public or a part of the public. Whether the act has such
"substantial and rational" or "reasonable" relation to the objects
enumerated is determined by balancing all the interests and
determining whether the predominant effect of the act is such
that any generalization resulting from sustaining it will open a
way for attack by the majority upon a fundamental condition
of the existence of the social order.
(2) If the determination of the application of such a formula
is left to be decided upon the face of the act and such facts as
the court takes judicial notice of, the balancing of interests may
be attempted upon such partial and incomplete data as will
"DUE PROCESS"
require one decision, when upon a complete presentation of the
conflicting interests, the result would be different. Therefore,
the case upon the balancing of the interests should be built up
by each side with all the data of which the court will take judicial
notice and the actual proof of other material facts properly incor-
porated in the record.
(3) Whoever may have the burden of proving facts which
show the act to be valid or invalid, the burden of going forward
with evidence or facts of which the court takes judicial notice
may shift from one party to the other. If the case is decided
upon the face of the act and such facts as the court takes judicial
notice of without looking further than its own experience and
general knowledge, one result may be required. If many facts
are brought to the attention of the court by the presentation of
sources of which it takes judicial notice, a different result may
be reached. If, however, actual evidence is presented respecting
the particular business or industry affected in the particular
locality where the legislation is operative, the court might
properly go back to its first position.
(4) What are the "fundamental conditions upon which the
existence of the social order rests" should not be left entirely
to the "judgment," or "intuition," or visceral sensations of the
judiciary. In short, they should not, so far as counsel are con-
cerned, continue to be "the inarticulate major premise." They
should be discussed and arguments made as to whether such a
fundamental condition is involved. The fact that the court in
its opinions will continue to leave the major premise inarticulate
should not be a cause for discouragement. The silence of the
court in its public utterances is based upon obvious reasons of
policy. In the conference room there will, no doubt, be much
appreciation of the efforts of counsel to articulate the major
premise. ALBERT M. KALES.
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